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Abstract— Server virtualization is a key technology for today’s
data centers, allowing dedicated hardware to be turned into
resources that can be used on demand. However, in spite of
its important role, the overall security impact of virtualization is
not well understood. To remedy this situation, we have performed
a systematic literature review on the security effects of virtua-
lization. Our study shows that, given adequate management,
the core virtualization technology has a clear positive effect on
availability, but that the effect on confidentiality and integrity
is less positive. Virtualized systems tend to lose the properties
of location-boundedness, uniqueness and monotonicity. In order
to ensure corporate and private data security, we propose to
either remove or tightly manage non-essential features such as
introspection, rollback and transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Server virtualization, running many virtual servers on one
physical machine, has become widespread in recent years.
With respect to security, claimed improvements are the in-
creased availability of applications and the isolation of pro-
cesses. Virtualization also has security drawbacks, such as
exploitable weaknesses in virtualization software, the existence
of covert channels and the possibility of new types of malware.
However, apart from these distinct threats, not so much is
known about the overall security effect of virtualization. Under
which circumstances does virtualization improve security, and
under which does it pose a threat? In order to answer these
questions, we have to distinguish between different features
of virtualization and show their interactions. Based on a
systematic literature review, we aggregate the literature on the
security impact of virtualization for each feature and show how
these features fit together. We conclude with an overview of
how to maximize the security benefits, from both a technical
and a management point of view.
II. BACKGROUND ON VIRTUALIZATION
A. Types of virtualization
Generally, virtualization is a software layer that implements
a (hardware) architecture. Such an approach can be useful for
resources such as harddisks, networks and complete machines,
providing a consistent interface to decouple software systems
from the hardware on which they are running, making them
more portable and providing easier management. In this paper
we focus on machine virtualization, where the instruction
set of a CPU architecture is emulated on a real physical
machine. 1 With respect to virtual machines (VMs), the
abstraction layer is called virtual machine monitor (VMM).
The VMM controls the VMs running on top of it. VMMs can
also be joined together, resulting in a virtualized infrastructure.
In this infrastructure, capabilities such as load balancing are
managed from a central location. We call this infrastructure
and its management the “VMMM”, an acronym for virtual
machine monitors’ management.
B. Usage of virtualization
Virtualization can be used for many purposes, for example
software testing or providing uniform desktops to end-users.
Obviously, the security effects differ for each type of usage.
In the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on the security
effects for running production applications, where a business’s
applications are placed inside VMs. The reason for this choice
is that here the security concerns are the greatest.
III. RESEARCH APPROACH
A. Research design
The literature study is based on the method described by
Webster and Watson. [2] Here, literature is retrieved from
well-known sources such as leading journals and additional
literature is found by tracing back the cited papers and for-
ward towards conferences papers. The findings are presented
concept-centric, meaning all literature on a certain concept
is discussed in one section. For this study, we began with a
literature search on Scopus2 yielding a total of 151 papers
of which 46 were relevant. Literature from other sources was
also included, such as datasheets from virtualization product
vendors such as VMware.
Here, we choose to present the results centered around
specific features of virtualization. Obviously, a complex tech-
nology such as virtualization can be split up in many ways,
and each choice is to some extent arbitrary. For this model,
we used the following guidelines:
1) A feature represents a distinct piece of functionality,
characteristic or architecture, having a unique impact on
security.
1For a taxonomy on virtualization we refer to Smith and Nair. [1]
2www.scopus.com
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2) Existing decompositions found in the literature should
be used as much as possible.
3) A feature should be widely used, not just being imple-
mented by one vendor in one product.
For each feature, we present the security effects, together with
a key reference. When no direct security effects were found,
we added analytical claims based on the literature studied.
B. Conceptual model
Virtualization technology consists of features, which are
divided into five groups:
1) features of virtualization capable hardware
2) features of VMs
3) features of individual VMMs
4) features of VMMMs
5) features arising from unintended interactions between
features
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the groups. The
hardware (1) enables virtualization, several VMs (2) run on
top of a group of VMMs (3) and the VMMs are managed by
a VMMM(4), leading to emergent features (5).
(3) VMM VMMVMM
(4) VMMM
(2) VM VM
(5) 
Emergent
features
(1) Hardware
VM VM
HardwareHardware
Fig. 1. Groups of virtualization features
The threat model used in this paper is essentially a white
box, assuming no trusted components of the virtualization
technology. As such, we depart from earlier threat models cre-
ated by Vaarela [3] and VMware [4]. Since we are considering
production applications, the ultimate security objective is to
protect the application running inside a VM. In our model,
threats to this application can originate from five different
components: (i) hardware, (ii) other VMs, (iii) VMMs, (iv)
VMMMs and (v) network.
Hardware threats are not discussed in this paper, because
these are mostly generic threats such as theft that are not
specifically relevant virtualization. More technical information
on virtualization hardware is available from Perez et al. [5]
Combined, this leads to the model of threats depicted in
figure 2.
IV. SECURITY IMPACT PER FEATURE GROUP
We now list what is currently known about the security
impact of all the different features per group. Security claims
in the literature are split over three categories: (i) analytical
claims, based on logical arguments, (ii) empirical claims,
based on experiments and (iii) claims based on mathematical
models. The first category was dominant. Only one paper fitted
into the third category, calculating the reliability of different
virtualization architectures. [6])
Threat source Explanation
Network  VMMM An outsider attacks the VMMM
Network  VMM An outsider attacks the VMM
Network  VM An outsider attacks the VM
VMMM  VMM A VMMM attacks a VMM
VMM  VM A VMM attacks a VM
VM  VM A VM attacks another VM
Fig. 2. Virtualization threats
A. Features of hardware
We list two important hardware features below. For more
detailed information on other virtualization hardware issues,
we refer to Uhlig et al. [7] and Van Doorn [8].
1) Trap program execution: The essential hardware feature
enabling virtualization (present in all modern x86 hardware)
is the ability to trap the execution of a running process and
hand over control of the CPU to the VMM. [9] This allows
the VMM to intervene in the execution of the process. In such
a way, the VMM can perform two critical tasks: (i) emulate
certain hardware and (ii) isolate the virtual machine from other
running processes.
2) Trusted Platform Module: An optional hardware feature
is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip, which can be used
to verify that the proper VMM is indeed running, as opposed
to an insecure version installed by an attacker. [5]
B. Features of VMs
1) Store VM as image: VMs consist of files, holding the
machine’s own data, as well as some metadata (amount of
memory used, number of CPUs)3. This approach allows easy
copying of the VM by a VMM, at the cost of possible
confidentiality and integrity breaches.
2) Modified VM software: The software running inside
VMs can be equipped with so-called hooks that can be used
to contact the VMM in order to execute security checks. [12]
C. Features of individual VMMs
1) Small footprint: Generally, the amount of exploitable
vulnerabilities is proportional to the amount of code. VMMs
are notably smaller than the previous hardware interface layer,
the operating system (OS) and are therefore deemed to be more
secure. [13]
2) Hierarchical control: The VMM layer is designed to
control the VMs using the underlying hardware. Therefore it
should not be possible for code running inside the VM to
“escape” to the VMM and gain control over it. However, such
escapes are possible, both in laboratory experiments [15] as
well as in production environments [16].
3) Isolation between processes: VMMs provide better iso-
lation between virtual machines than an operating system,
in which applications can normally interact. [17] However,
covert channels are still an issue in existing VMM implemen-
tations. [13]
3An overview of common VM data elements was created by the Distributed
Management Task Force (DMTF), an IT industry consortium. [10]
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4) Logging: Virtualization can help to implement secure
logging: during the execution of the VM, the VMM collects
data and stores it in a place outside of the VM. Therefore it
cannot be altered by an exploit that is contained inside the
VM. Such a feature is implemented in ReVirt. [18]
5) Load balancing: VMMs can determine (and limit) the
CPU cycles and disk space that a VM uses. This prevents a
VM from starving the other VMs of resources.
6) Copy and backup VMs: Making backups and copies
of VMs is easier than making copies of data on physical
machines. Therefore, a defective VM can be easily replaced
by a working version.
7) Introspection: Since the VMM is placed at a lower level
than the VM, it has the ability to “look inside the VM”, to see
its data and monitor its execution. This process is called virtual
machine introspection. [19] The functionality can be used
to run security applications such as virus scanners, intrusion
detection systems such as Livewire [20], and policy checkers.
Because these are outside of the VM, the VM cannot interfere
with them. However, this feature also provides a new location
for installing malware.
8) Attestation: If an inspection of a VM is performed, the
VMM can send the results (the attestation) to another party.
Based on the results, the receiving party can authenticate the
VM, and decide whether to trust it. For optimal confidence,
this function is best used in combination with trusted hardware
(as in the Terra VMM [21]).
9) Interference: In some cases intrusions cannot just be
detected, but intervention may be possible: Once the VMM
detects a malicious program running inside a VM, its memory
can be altered, preventing its execution. [19]
10) Power functions: VMMs control the execution of a
VM, as if it would have a virtual power button. Commonly,
several functions are provided: start/power on, stop/power off,
pause/suspend and reboot/reset. These functions are useful to
increase availability, for example if a VM crashes, it can be
more easily rebooted than if it were a physical machine, and it
is also easier to limit resource usage by simply pausing VMs
that are not needed.
11) Networking: VMMs can configure the network, so that
a VM only communicates with predefined VMs, forming a
virtual network that does not require hardware changes. The
networking functions can also be used to monitor traffic, for
example running an intrusion detection system.
12) Rollback: Another feature that can be provided by a
VMM is to rollback actions of a VM. [22] For example
Microsoft Hyper-V has a feature to create a snapshot. [23]
If a problem is detected, the VM can be restored to an earlier
state.
13) VM Management: In order to manage the previously
described features, a user interface has to be provided to
control the VMM and the VMs that it runs. The management
can be done from another machine (virtual or physical). For
example Xen is designed to use a specific VM (“Dom0”) for its
management. [13] Obviously, this enlarges the small footprint
that was supposed to be a strong asset of the VMM.
D. Features of VMMMs
1) Transfer: VMMM can transfer (”migrate”) running vir-
tual machines between physical servers. [24] [25] This feature
can be useful if a physical machine has to undergo main-
tenance. Unfortunately, the feature also creates an identity
problem, for example when the network ID (often the MAC
address) is reassigned randomly after the transfer [22]. Some
VMMs can retain the MAC address during a live transfer. [24]
If the transfer channel is not secure, the VM can be modified
while in transit. [26] Improper management can also lead
to the transfer of VMs to unsecure hosts, to breaches of
confidentiality and to denial-of-service (DOS) attacks if too
many virtual machines are migrated to one VMM host.
2) Replication: Apart from being transferred, VMs can also
be replicated on different physical servers. [27] This is useful
to ward off a DOS attack, to distribute workload and to cope
with hardware failures. At the downside, replication can be
used to have VMs run on less secure locations, as was the
case for the transfer feature. Obviously, the security of a VM
is determined by all the physical hosts it has run on.
3) Load balancing: Features such as transfer and replica-
tion can be used for load balancing across different physical
machines, increasing the availability of applications.
4) Patching: A benefit of VMMs is that they can contain
software to ease the process of patching, such as VMware’s
vCenter Update Manager. [28] This software inspects VMs
to check for missing patches. Before patching, a snapshot is
made of the system. If the patching fails, the VM can revert to
the snapshot. Thus VMMs make it extremely easy to rollback
patches, making patching a non-monotonic process [22].
An additional issue is that VMMs themselves also have to be
patched [29], and this is more critical - if a VMM is breached,
the breach might be impossible to detect because the VMM
is the lowest layer of the IT stack.
5) VMM management: If several VMMs are linked to-
gether, their work needs to be coordinated from a special
server, such as vCenter from VMware [28]. This gives the
administrators enormous power, since they can control any
VMM and any VM running on it from a single point. Another
side effect is that the trusted code base is increased (similar
to the management domain for a single VMM).
E. Features emerging from interactions
In the past sections, we have discussed many virtualization
features, some of which have a positive effect on security,
whereas others have a negative impact. In this section, we
aggregate these into three emerging features that were not
explicitly designed, but rather evolved from the interaction
between existing features. This high-level clustering helps to
understand the effects.
1) Loss of uniqueness of machines and data: In a non-
virtualized server environment, applications, servers and data
are to a great extent unique. However, the replication and
copy/backup features reduce the uniqueness of these.
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2) Loss of location-boundedness of data: It is difficult to
ascertain the location of a certain VM [30], since it can move
between different physical servers, due to features such as
transfer, replication and backup. In fact this also holds for the
virtual location of a VM: if the networks are also virtualized,
a VM can be accidentally dragged-and-dropped outside of a
DMZ.
3) Loss of monotonicity of program execution: Virtuali-
zation technology causes a server’s history to stop being a
straight line. [22] Instead it becomes a graph, where branches
are made on replication and copy operations, and a previous
state can be reached when a restore is performed. Data is hard
to delete as there are potentially many copies and the VM can
be restored to an earlier version. [22]
V. OVERALL IMPACT OF VIRTUALIZATION
The overall effects of virtualization technology depend not
just on the technology itself, but also on the environment in
which it is used. Conceptually we therefore split the causes
into three groups:
1) the technical capabilities of features and their security
effects
2) the selection of features that can be made in practice
3) the management of the selected features in practice
The first aspect is illustrated in figure 4 where a summary
of all features and their effect on security is provided. For
each feature, we show its known effect on all five security
properties. A + sign indicates that the functionality provided
by the feature has a positive effect on security (compared
to a non-virtualized situation), without placing high demands
on the environment regarding management, whereas a −
indicates the opposite: the feature is technically vulnerable
or can be easily misused. Furthermore a ± indicates that the
security effect depends on the particular implementation or the
circumstances, or that the literature indicates both positive and
negative effects. Finally an empty cell indicates that we could
not find or deduce an effect on a security property. In the
threats column of figure 4 we can find which feature requires
strict management.
The dependencies shown in figure 3 shed light on the
second group, showing which features are optional. As for the
precise meaning of feature dependencies, we take the practical
approach that given two features A and B, A depends on
B when logically it cannot function independently from B
without duplicating part of B’s functionality. To keep the
diagram clear, the dependencies of the management features
are not shown, but obviously, these depend on the other
features in the VMM and VMMM layer respectively.
A technological weakness can be mitigated by strong proce-
dural security, and vice versa can a secure technology be mis-
used in practice. Taking this into account, we have attempted
to present the overall security impact of virtualization, as can
be expected in practice for each of the five security properties
in the next sections.
A. Confidentiality
Virtualization threatens confidentiality in several ways.
First, the introspection feature gives the VMM the ability
to look inside the VM. This feature can be misused or
attacked. The problem is aggravated by the fact that VMs can
be transferred between different physical servers. Obviously,
replication features only increase the problem.
B. Integrity
Together with the features of intervention and rollback
comes the ability to manipulate the state of a VM, which
threatens the integrity of the transactions done on a VM.
C. Availability
The availability of applications running on VMs will most
likely improve: VMs can be transferred for maintenance
purposes, restored when a failure occurs and replicated if the
workload requires it. (Cf. Jansen et al. [6]) However it must be
noted that virtualization is not without availability risks, as was
demonstrated by an attack on the virtualization infrastructure
of the web hosting company VAServe, where 100.000 sites
were deleted [31].
D. Authenticity
Virtualization creates identification problems. If a VM is
duplicated there no longer is one original machine. Also, the
identity of the machine used for communications (such as the
MAC address) might change during a transfer.
E. Non-repudiation
Since virtual machines can be duplicated, rolled back and
restored, there seems to be a fundamental problem regarding
non-repudiation. If evidence of transactions is stored in a VM
in the form of a transaction log, this can be lost if the state
of a VM is restored. If transactions are signed, the key with
which this is done is also stored on the VM, and can thus be
copied.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the results of a literature study on the
effects of virtualization technology. As a whole, virtualization
has a positive effect on availability but threatens confidential-
ity, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation, even though
many features are designed with these goals in mind.
Some core features of virtualization (isolation between
processes and small footprint) have clear positive effects on
most security properties, but it is clear that these effects
are mitigated by newer features built on top of these. They
make the VMM layer bloated [9], increasing the likelihood
of bugs, giving much more control to the administrators and
lead to the emergent properties of loss of uniqueness, location
boundedness and monotonicity.
Especially because the technology is widely deployed, these
security problems are surprising, which might underscore the
need for further research, especially in the form of case
studies regarding current practices in enterprises. However,
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Fig. 3. Feature dependencies (Arrow from A to B indicates that A depends on B)
whatever the outcome of these case studies might be, we
believe that there is a fundamental limit as to what safely can
be virtualized. A network where the audit trails of the VMMs,
the identity of the administrators, and the DNS servers are all
virtualized, lacks a single system from which to build trust as
all systems becomes fluid.
A. Recommendations
In this final section, several recommendations are discussed,
concerning how to develop and use virtualization technology
securely.
1) Virtualization technology design: We propose to limit
the possibilities for introspection and intervention of VMMs,
such that they cannot affect the application (threatening in-
tegrity) and cannot steal data from them (threatening confiden-
tiality). If virtualization really is just an infrastructure layer,
its functionality should simply focus on availability.
2) Application design: Considering the problems of book-
keeping in a virtualized infrastructure, the question can be
raised whether applications running inside VMs should be
redesigned to facilitate batch processing and checkpointing.
A single run of a VM (from begin to end of a job) can then
be validated as a whole, and security issues with restores and
rollback operations do not apply any more.
3) Virtualization deployment and management: If anything,
the management of this infrastructure should be more strictly
organized than a physical one because it is much more power-
ful. In fact, the virtual infrastructure should be considered to
be a complete machine in itself, which should be put in one
physical location, with tight security controls.
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